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The Uses of Mindfulness in Anti-oppressive
Pedagogies: Philosophy and Praxis
Deborah Orr
In this article, I argue that educators can utilize mindfulness practices to enhance the
efficacy of anti-oppressive pedagogy. The philosophies of Wittgenstein and Nagarjuna
provide a holistic human ontology and show that learning affects students at all levels:
mind, body, emotion, and spirit. My analysis of the phenomenology of thinking reveals
the modes of relationship to ideation. I have proposed mindfulness practice as a proven
technique to address the non-cognitive forms of attachment to ideation that may remain
in force despite the most thorough-going intellectual change.
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Dans cet article, l’auteure fait valoir que les enseignants peuvent utiliser des pratiques
attentionnées pour augmenter l’efficacité de la pédagogie libertaire. Les philosophies de
Wittgenstein et de Nagarjuna permettent une ontologie humaine holistique et démontrent
que l’apprentissage affecte les étudiants sur tous les plans : l’intelligence, le corps, les
émotions et l’esprit. Les analyses de la phénoménologie de la pensée révèlent les types
de relation à l’idéation. La pratique attentionnée est proposée comme une technique qui
a fait ses preuves pour traiter les formes d’attachement hors du champ cognitif à l’idéation
qui demeure active malgré le plus profond changement intellectuel.
Mots-clés : pédagogie attentionnée, pédagogie libertaire, pédagogie critique, méditation
attentionnée
––––––––––––––––
In response to the work of Paulo Freire (1981) many feminist and other
anti-oppressive teachers at all levels of education have abandoned, or at
least drastically modified, what he has called “the banking concept of
pedagogy” (p. 58), the philosophy and pedagogical praxis that assert
that the primary task of teachers is to fill their students’ heads with
established knowledge and instrumental procedures. The counter-
discourses that were developed and implemented pedagogically in the
latter decades of the last century have now further eroded faith in the
banking concept.
Following Freire’s work and energized by the social movements and
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raised consciousness of the late twentieth century, educators have carried
out numerous experiments with anti-oppressive and liberatory
pedagogies, and from these trials came many of the new techniques and
bodies of knowledge that now inform teaching praxes. Teachers who
have made transitions from the old banking style to new alternatives as
well as those younger colleagues who have been introduced to new
methods are justified in feeling that much progress has been made: there
has been a salutary loosening of entrenched forms of social oppression,
and students are using critical skills and developing forms of knowledge
that were undreamed of just a few decades ago. And yet, and yet . . .
In his critique of the “hidden curriculum” of traditional education,
McLaren (1989) noted that the hidden curriculum “represents much more
than a program of study, a classroom text, or a course syllabus”; rather,
he continues, it represents the “introduction to a particular form of life; it serves
in part to prepare students for dominant or subordinate positions in the existing
society” (p.183, italics in original). To effect this social positioning it “favors
certain forms of knowledge over others and affirms the dreams, desires,
and values of select groups of students over other groups, often
discriminatorily on the basis of race, class, and gender” (p. 183). The last
several decades of the twentieth century were rich in pedagogical
innovation that teachers developed not only in response to the critiques
of Freire, McLaren, and others but also out of their growing awareness of
inequities in their own classrooms. In their sensitivity to multiple forms
of classroom oppression and silencing, in their openness to alternative
points of view, in their willingness to deal with the life experiences of
students outside the classroom, and in their encouragement of student-
directed forms of intellectual enquiry and creativity, the new anti-
oppressive pedagogies strove to take into account the lives of students.
Along with new forms of knowledge, this approach has resulted in often
passionate classroom debates, not only deep intellectual but often deep
emotional struggles, by both students and faculty, to come to terms with
what they are learning. In spite of the inevitable challenges, students
and teachers have made conscious and concerted attempts to make
education, in the words of bell hooks in her trenchant critique of Freire,
“the practice of freedom” (hooks, 1994a, p. 51), by finding ways to bridge
the gap between theory and practice in their lives (hooks, 1994b).
At the same time, as I read the literature and engage with my own
classrooms, I have become increasingly uneasy with a sense that we are,
in some respects, still buying into a phallocentric and Eurocentric model
of teaching and learning and so reproducing its hidden “logic of
THE USES OF MINDFULNESS IN ANTI-OPPRESSIVE PEDAGOGIES 479
domination” (Warren, 1988, p. 32). As philosopher Karen Warren
describes it, a logic of domination is a conceptual schema structured by
oppositional and mutually exclusive binarisms and bolstered by value
assumptions of relative worth and competency that serve to organize
and ground social patterns of domination and oppression (pp. 31–32).
From Plato’s metaphysical distinction of Being from Becoming in the
Classical Greek era, to the present-day variations on Descartes’ separation
of cogito from body, Western culture has been organized around the mind/
body binarism and the assumption that mind is both radically distinct
from and of greater worth than body. This assumption has been
elaborated ideologically and institutionally to structure the discourses
of sexism, racism, class, homophobia, and other forms of discrimination.
In each social category the privileged group has been identified with
mind and the intellectual activities of cultural production and
administration, while the subordinated group has been affiliated with
the body, emotion, and physical and reproductive labour. Although
scholars and researchers in many disciplines are now contesting the
radical separation of the binarisms that structure the logic of domination,
the hidden curriculum often continues to exert its insidious influence in
schools because at a subtle level educators are still drawing on the logic
of domination’s foundational dichotomization of mind and body: it is
still widely held as axiomatic that academic learning is essentially a
mentative process. Educational institutions both reflect and entrench
the ramifications of this ideological valorization of mind and suspicion
of embodied experience in their endorsement of pedagogical practices
grounded in the belief that, while the learning process and knowledge
production may be stimulated by or call up emotional experience, this
experience is extraneous to the processes of learning and knowledge
production and should be viewed with suspicion (see Jaggar, 1989).
Although feminist teachers and others have contested the mind/body
binarism and worked to find ways to integrate both the body and emotion
as an aspect of embodiment into intellectual work, the possibility occurs
that there may even be other aspects of a student’s being beyond mind,
body, and emotion that are implicated in genuine learning. The spiritual,
for instance, is rarely considered. My aim in this article is to explore
ways to deepen the liberatory potential of anti-oppressive pedagogies
by digging yet more deeply into the role of the logic of domination and
especially its foundational mind/body binarism in the organization of
teaching and learning, and then by suggesting a more holistic theory
and praxis.
I have found the source for the issues I explore in this article and the
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suggestions I offer to address them in the ongoing dialogue between my
classroom experiences and a wide range of critiques of the logic of
domination, most especially of its grounding mind/body binarism. I have
drawn those critiques widely from the resources of world philosophy, in
particular from key thinkers in the Hindu and Buddhist yoga traditions.
I have gone to access forms of analysis that are unavailable in
contemporary Western work, and to introduce practices that can be
adapted for classroom use to expand students’ awareness of the function
of oppressive dualistic discourses in their thought and, more broadly, in
their lives. The analyses engaged below demonstrate that no matter how
radical the new critiques and the pedagogies that emerged from them
have been, both the new forms of knowledge production and the
knowledge that they have so successfully produced remain largely
cognitive and so function primarily on the intellectual level in students’
lives. Such pedagogical praxes, which remain situated on the dominant
side of the mind/body binarism, are not, nor can they be, entirely
successful in creating the necessary conditions to achieve the deep levels
of transformation in the lives of students that, according to McLaren
(1989), critical pedagogy seeks to effect because its impact on the body,
emotions, spirit, and the lived sense of self and other can only be
incompletely addressed through purely intellectual methods (Orr, 2004).
If the arguments offered below to challenge the mind/body binarism and
develop an integrated, holistic concept of human being are correct, then
they show that we stand in need of pedagogic praxes that engage students
in a more holistic fashion than is typically the case with critical pedagogy.
As I argue below, in a holistic account, learning takes place not only in
the mind but on all levels of a student’s being. Consequently, I propose
that the mindfulness practices that have been developed by the yoga
traditions to address binaristic thinking can be usefully integrated into
critical pedagogy. These techniques can be used to address oppressive
ideologies and practices in the lives of students and thereby foster change
not only on the intellectual level of a student’s learning but also on the
levels of body, emotion, and spirit, the levels where the most insidious
and resistant formations of oppression are often lodged.
Because Western discourses have essentialized mind as the mark of
the human and have claimed that its fullest development is to be found
among the members of dominant elites (males, whites, upper classes),
and because those discourses have severed the functions of the mind
from other aspects of human experience, the critique and dissolution of
the mind/body binarism are a root issue not only for theoretical holistic
pedagogy but also for feminist and other anti-oppressive theory and
THE USES OF MINDFULNESS IN ANTI-OPPRESSIVE PEDAGOGIES 481
praxis. Implicit in the formation of the model of mindful pedagogy
developed below is the de-essentializing and radical reformulation of
our notions of both personhood and understanding. Thus, the
development of the holistic paradigm for teaching and learning can
further the theoretical aim of feminist and other anti-oppressive
discourses of integrating non-cognitive aspects of experience into a more
adequate and coherent concept of personhood. At the same time mindful
pedagogical praxis can advance their practical goal of creating the
conditions for non-discriminatory experience both inside and beyond
the classroom.
In what follows I show that the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s mature
period provides a philosophical grounding for the holistic, de-
essentialized concept of the person that anti-oppressive work requires
(Orr, 2002a); however, he does not provide an adequate technique for
unlearning the discourses of oppression. For this we must look elsewhere.
The affinities between the linguistic philosophy of Wittgenstein and that
of the second-century Indian Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna are great
and have been well documented (Gudmunsen, 1977; Streng, 1967). Like
Wittgenstein’s, Nagarjuna’s philosophy provides a vigorous critique of
essentialism, binaristic conceptual schemata, and reified concepts of the
self. And, like Wittgenstein, Nagarjuna acknowledges the importance of
embodied experience for learning and understanding. Although their
work is in many ways similar, Nagarjuna is particularly useful for the
development of anti-oppressive pedagogy because it is an integral part
of a set of yogic meditation practices, including mindfulness techniques,
which have proved efficacious in providing access to non-cognitive levels
of learning. Thus, I engage his work to develop the argument for the role
of mindfulness in the anti-oppressive classroom. This discussion is
supplemented by the work of Dogen, the thirteenth-century Japanese
Zen master and philosopher, to provide a phenomenological description
of thinking and thus a clarification of the ways in which a student relates
to ideas. In the sections that follow, I argue that Wittgenstein and
Nagarjuna provide a philosophical “therapy” (Wittgenstein, 1968, sec.
133) for the intellect, Dogen provides a phenomenology of thinking, and
mindful yoga and meditation, a set of therapies for individual lived
experience that can effect a loosening of the ideological formations that
structure the lived experience of oppression.
On a cautionary note, only fairly recently have Western comparative
philosophers begun to explore the complex similarities and differences
between Western and Eastern intellectual paradigms (see Ames, 1994;
Hall & Ames, 1995; Katz, 1981; Solomon & Higgins, 1993), and in light of
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this research we must acknowledge that drawing together the work of
philosophers of such cultural and historical diversity is fraught with
dangers. This connection is of particular concern given the orientalizing
proclivities of Western intellectuals, and so we must be especially alert
to the danger of assuming that Western scholars can transpose Western
meanings to other cultures. Of particular concern for this article is the
fact that neither the word philosophy, with its connotation of abstract,
disinterested thought, nor any close analog to that word, is to be found
in the contemporaneous languages of Nagarjuna or Dogen (see Potter,
1991), and yet I have called them philosophers and spoken of their work
as philosophy. One might justify this decision by noticing that, especially
in the work of Nagarjuna, the treatment of issues and the development of
patterns of argumentation resonate with Western concerns and
argumentative styles; however, this observation runs the risk of
obscuring substantive differences in their strictly philosophical
production (Katz, 1981) as well as the very different uses to which the
work of Eastern and Western thinkers has been put in their various
milieus (Pye, 1978; Schroeder, 2001). Although a full exploration of the
many issues raised by bringing Wittgenstein, Nagarjuna, and Dogen
together is well beyond the scope of this article, in what follows I have
developed some of the similarities in the work of each of them to draw
out the ways in which they can contribute to the development of holistic
pedagogy while at the same time noticing some of the significant ways in
which they differ.
WITTGENSTEIN’S HOLISTIC LEARNER
Different concepts of human ontology each imply an epistemological
theory that in turn support a particular model of teaching and learning.
If, for instance, mind and body are radically separate entities, then the
banking model of teaching that Freire critiqued gains considerable
plausibility. Alternatively, if we opt for a materialistic human ontology,
then a behaviourist approach makes best sense. Post-structuralism and
radical constructionism, which often tend to downplay, if not erase
entirely, the body and non-constructed experience (see Butler, 1990;
Foucault, 1977), have yet other implications. In this section I explore
some aspects of Wittgenstein’s work that provide the conceptual tools
for developing a holistic, integrated, and de-essentialized concept of
human being that foregrounds the importance of embodiment for
learning, and then I begin to work out the implications of his work for a
holistic critical pedagogy.
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The detailed critiques in Philosophical Investigations (1968) of referential
theories of meaning, learning by ostentation and/or definition, and
mechanistic models of rule-following — the accounts of learning and
understanding that proponents of rationalistic theories of education most
frequently draw on — all serve to undermine the radical distinction
between mind and body that has grounded the traditional pedagogical
praxis of the dominant culture. Because these negative arguments are
balanced by a series of demonstrations of the ways in which
understanding is interwoven into lived, and frequently pre- and/or non-
linguistic, behaviour, they seriously challenge any radical post-
structuralist account that seeks to focus on pure textuality, as well as the
more common rationalistic and materialistic theories.
In the major work of his mature period Wittgenstein (1968)
demonstrated that, although emerging out of and in many ways
continuous with the natural world, the person is sui generis and cannot
be reduced to the categories of matter, mind, or language. This perspective
emerges from his sustained exploration of the topics of language
acquisition and use along with the interlocking issues of meaning,
understanding, and knowing, key areas of concern for any educator. With
the development of his notion of language-games, Wittgenstein argued
that language acquisition is best understood as a form of training in
which language is woven into the unique matrix of human experience,
much of which is non-linguistic. For Wittgenstein a language-game
consists of “the language and the actions into which it is woven” (Sec. 7).
His attention to the role of language in language-games weakens the
plausibility of purely cognitive models of learning and gives credibility
to a more holistic and experiential model. Wittgenstein used the concept
of language-games along with a multi-faceted attack on both dualistic
mentalist and monistic materialist theories of human being to show that
the criteria of the concepts of mentation — knowing, believing, doubting,
understanding, and others — lie in human experience and behaviours,
not in the occurrence of inaccessible events in a hypothetical mind, nor
in mere overt behaviour. To know, believe, doubt, or understand
something is logically internally related to human behaviour in the
broadest sense of the word. The examples Wittgenstein analyzed range
from language-games involving subjective experience, to natural
responses to others, to attitudes, bodily actions, and complex social
practices. What is being foregrounded throughout Wittgenstein’s work
is that, because the person as a whole learns, not a disembodied mind or
mechanistic body, learning affects the whole person. Thus, for example,
learning the discourses of sexism is more than acquiring a set of ideas or
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even a set of behaviours. It will colour, as McLaren (1989) has pointed
out, the entirety of an individual’s being — behaviours, feelings, values,
aspirations, orientation of spirit — and often in very subtle and
subconscient ways.
The concept of language-games, a complex one in Wittgenstein’s work,
resists a simple definition. In an early discussion he stated that the term
is “meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language
is part of an activity, or a form of life” (1968, sec. 23, italics in original).
Language, he held, is part of human “natural history” (sec. 25) that serves
to shape pre- and non-linguistic human experience in a range of culturally
established ways. For example, in one well-known passage that throws
light on the development of sexism, he maintained that in teaching a
child the language of sensations, such as the word pain, adults teach the
child “new pain-behaviour” (Sec. 244).
The significance of this example becomes apparent on considering the
differences in the uses boys and girls are taught to make of this word. In
the modern West many boys are socialized to the mandated masculine
identity by being taught that “big boys don’t cry.” Thus they learn that
it is not appropriate for them to engage in a language-game that is
strongly endorsed for girls. And along with the acquisition of their
differential uses of language, boys and girls “swallow down” (1969, sec.
143) associated sexist attitudes and behaviours, as this simple example
clearly demonstrates. In their differential learning of the language-game
of pain their culture subtly shapes boys and girls in ways of which they
may be largely unaware. Nevertheless, this learning will configure
attitudes, experiences, and behaviours about both themselves and others.
Wittgenstein’s demonstrations of the historical-cultural grounding of
language-games and of the ways in which they serve to shape human
experience are developed for a wide range of language-games. These
include the games of mathematics and science (1969, 1975), religious belief
(1972), self-understanding and understanding and responding to others
(1968), and many others. In a very real sense, then, with this work
Wittgenstein has shown that people are the language-games they learn
to play.
The following classroom example, in which teaching addresses the
ideas students hold but fails to challenge the non-cognitive aspects of
their learning, illustrates the importance of Wittgenstein’s theory of
language-games. As is widely acknowledged, boys and young men
internalize still-pervasive male social privilege and the ideology that
grounds it. The sexist language-games through which boys assimilate
and experience ideology may then manifest in a variety of conscious and
THE USES OF MINDFULNESS IN ANTI-OPPRESSIVE PEDAGOGIES 485
unconscious forms in the feminist classroom. On an ideological level a
pedagogy that deconstructs masculinity to expose its contradictions and
to reveal to the male student his own conflicted position as both oppressor
and oppressed might successfully challenge sexism (Orr, 1993). Although
this deconstruction might successfully change ideology, and even have a
quite strong impact on behaviour, Wittgenstein’s holistic human ontology
suggests that important levels of a student’s being remain unaffected by
his new knowledge.
 As noted, Wittgenstein showed that the process of language acquisition
is usefully seen as a sort of “training” (1968, sec. 5, 6, 9, passim) that
involves weaving language into natural, extra-linguistic behaviours and
abilities in a process that moulds and shapes them in conformity with
society’s needs and ideology. This process results in the formation of a
repertoire of socially shared language-games developed from, and at the
same time shaping, human potential.
This brief sketch of Wittgenstein’s views on language acquisition
suggests that ideation — and the ideology of masculinity — is much
more than an intellectual content to which one may be emotionally
cathected; it constitutes the subject in the sense that the acquisition of
language-games contributes to establishing personhood. In consequence,
to change language-games in any profound way is necessarily much
more than to change a set of beliefs: it is to change the very being of a
student. Change, then, may involve a broad range of things including
any or all of a student’s beliefs, attitudes, behaviours, values, dreams,
and aspirations.
Two major points of interest for anti-oppressive pedagogy emerge
from this very brief survey of Wittgenstein’s work and its application to
sexist language-games. The first is that, because of the radical holism of a
person, a student in an anti-oppressive classroom must be taught as a
holistic being if educators hope to eradicate, or at least ameliorate, the
multiple forms of social discrimination in any but a superficial way (Orr,
forthcoming). The theoretical confrontation of ideology is of the utmost
importance, of course, but it is limited in its potential to effect liberation
because its impact is largely limited to one level of a student’s being: the
cognitive. The second point, which follows from the first, is that the full
scope of a student’s relationship with ideology — what Nagarjuna’s
tradition identified as the person’s forms of attachment to ideation —
must be addressed as such and in ways that can enable a student to
effect broad-based change in her or his life. What is involved here, as will
become clearer below in the section on the philosophy and practice of
mindfulness, is not a Freudian or psychotherapeutic treatment of emotion
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but rather the dismantling of oppressive language-games, of ways of
being that involve, but are not restricted to, ways of thinking (Kasulis,
1977). Thus anti-oppressive teachers who aim to enable profound change
must address linguistic practice holistically, not simply by replacing
problematic ideas with ideas they deem to be better.
The work of the second-century Indian philosopher Nagarjuna is a
necessary supplement to the work of Wittgenstein to address this issue.
Although they both understood the holistic nature of learning, only
Nagarjuna’s culture provides efficacious ways to challenge oppressive
ideas on other than a purely cognitive level. Thus Nagarjuna’s culture
provides access to the yogic meditation practices developed by Buddhism
and its mother tradition, Hinduism, practices that yoga teachers have
designed and refined over the course of millennia to loosen attachment
to dualistic and essentialized thinking and consequently to the
destructive ways of living that all cultures produce in their members.
NAGARJUNA AND A TECHNOLOGY OF THE SELF
The affinities between Wittgenstein’s work and that of Nagarjuna have
been explored in considerable depth (Gudmunsen 1977; Streng 1967).
These two historically and culturally remote thinkers have used a
methodologically similar approach of reductio argumentation against
philosophical positions that, although also historically and culturally
distant, are logically quite similar. They have arrived independently at
surprisingly similar positions with respect to human ontology,
epistemology, and conceptual logic. Their philosophical investigations
of conceptual grammar, in the view of both of them, effected a “therapy
of the understanding” (Wittgenstein, 1968, passim; see also Pye, 1978;
Schroeder, 2001) through clearing away confused and distorted ways of
thinking and thus allowing the emergence of more clear-headed ways of
understanding. Both believed that their therapy would enable the
development of ways of living to allow for greater human flourishing.
Through an examination of conceptual grammar, that is, the
relationships between and among linguistic and non-linguistic elements
of language-games, both Wittgenstein (1968) and Nagarjuna (1967)
provide powerful anti-essentialist and anti-nominalist arguments, and
both reject dualistic thinking on logical grounds. These outcomes are of
fundamental importance to anti-oppressive discourses and pedagogies
because the master dichotomization of mind and body and the subsequent
formations that have been attached to it and that reproduce its
valorization of the first term — being/becoming, male/female, reason/
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emotion, culture/nature, polis/domus, transcendent/immanent, good/evil
— have been a central concern of feminist discourse since its early, first-
wave inception. Arguably the logical elaboration of other manifestations
of alterity that are the foci of other anti-oppressive discourses — white/
minoritized, occidental/oriental, bourgeois/proletarian, heterosexual/
homosexual — are products of this founding move. Both philosophers
have addressed the logical crux of oppression in dualistic thinking and
essentialism and both have explored the ways in which conceptual
paradigms structure human life and experience: Wittgenstein with his
concept of language-games, Nagarjuna with his arguments to show that
the terms to which people form such deep and abiding attachments are
merely the conventions of human life with no self-subsistant ontological
status. In Nagarjuna’s terminology these terms are empty. Both held out
the promise that by addressing and overcoming the destructive ways of
thinking rooted in conceptual dualisms, a way of living that was free of
the ills this form of thinking created would be allowed to emerge.
Paradoxically, while affirming the inextricable connection between
ideas and praxis and the pernicious effect of misunderstood or confused
ideas on human life, Wittgenstein (1968) did not provide a “therapy of
life” to go along with his philosophical “therapy of the understanding”
that he designed to “battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence
by means of language” (sec. 109). He seemed to think that if people sorted
out their ideas, the rest of their life would follow along in due course.
Nagarjuna, on the other hand, was situated in a culture with a much
more highly developed and astute psychology that not only recognized
the intricate and complex relationships between ideas and all other
aspects of lived experience, but also provided techniques to address these
relationships. Although Western readers have often mistakenly
understood Nagarjuna as an academic-style philosopher, his
philosophical work is more accurately seen as one phase of a broader
program of transformation of the self in the context of his home culture.
He designed his anti-essentialist and anti-dualist arguments to be used
in conjunction with other meditation practices and techniques to help
overcome obstacles to the experiential understanding of emptiness
(Komito, 1987, p. 62; see also Pye, 1978; Schroeder, 2001).
In his Mulamadhyamakakarikas Nagarjuna (1967) subjected concepts and
positions that were central to the thought of his day, as well as to our
own, to a process of rigorous logical testing to determine if they could be
asserted with sense. He showed, for instance, that one could not assert of
a “self-existent thing,” that is, of an independent and unchanging essence,
either that it existed or that it did not exist by showing that either position
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resulted in either contradiction or incoherence (p. 15). Both Nagarjuna’s
philosophical demonstrations of emptiness, that is, that linguistic
categories do not function to denote essences or natural kinds (see Kasulis,
1981, pp. 16–28; Streng, 1967, pp. 69–81) and Wittgenstein’s location of
sense and meaning in language-games add significantly to the anti-
essentialist arguments of anti-oppressive discourses. The application of
Nagarjuna’s arguments to oppressive discourses shows, for example,
that no abiding reality to the categories of race or sex exists (p. 199).
Although race and sex have no essence, these constructs have a social
reality that can be powerful and tenacious; consequently they colour the
lives of the members of any society who have acquired the language-
games in which they function. Likewise, and following the logic of
emptiness, the self can not be accorded a fixed ontological status, although
its phenomenal reality is not denied (p. 18). But if language is empty, that
is, if it does not function to pick out essentialized entities, and if at the
same time people are constituted by language-games and deeply attached
to their linguistic categories, then what attitude ought one assume to
language, to others, and to oneself? This is a key issue, or complex of
issues, that yogic meditation techniques were designed to address.
Because of the holism of a human being and the consequent involvement
of all aspects of one’s being in learning, the intellectual acceptance of the
logical insights of Wittgenstein or Nagarjuna by itself achieves very
little. Understanding must encompass the totality of one’s experiences
and so one must achieve an experiential awareness of these insights to
fully understand them (Orr, forthcoming). The extensive body of
meditation techniques, which includes the practices of classical Hindu
yoga and the many Buddhist meditation techniques that were developed
out of them, were refined to facilitate this experiential awareness. Much
of the discourse surrounding meditation techniques acknowledges that
this process is gradual and staged. Thus, in this article I propose that
educators can adapt the more preliminary stages of the process to the
anti-oppressive classroom.
A common strand running through the meditation techniques
developed over many millennia and across many cultures is succinctly
captured by the contemporary researcher and teacher Jon Kabat-Zinn,
who characterizes them as “a particular way of paying attention, one
that gives rise to a moment-to-moment, non-judging awareness” (Kabat-
Zinn, 2000, p. 230). They are a set of non-denominational techniques that
aim to increase and clarify awareness of experience undistorted by such
things as the preconceptions, biases, and conditioning that are
internalized as one learns to participate in language-games. The insight
THE USES OF MINDFULNESS IN ANTI-OPPRESSIVE PEDAGOGIES 489
of the historical Buddha, Siddhartha Gautama, was that this keen, non-
judgmental awareness is impeded by a deep and pervasive attachment
to conceptualizations, most especially to distorted ideas about the nature
and permanence of the self (Schroeder, 2001, pp. 22–28). Nagarjuna’s
philosophy develops the logic of Gautama’s rejection of the tendency
either to reify and essentialize concepts, or to endorse nihilism. The refusal
to endorse any metaphysical position while at the same time
acknowledging the possibility of a valid role for language in everyday
talk is echoed in Wittgenstein’s work, especially in his valorization of the
“everyday use” (1968, sec. 116) of language and his demonstrations that
language-games function in the construction of subjectivity. Building on
Gautama’s work, meditation teachers have developed an extensive set of
meditation techniques designed to bring to experiential awareness the
ways in which a distorted or false idea manifests in an individual’s life
and, in the process of achieving this awareness, create the possibility of
change. What, then, is the proper use of concepts? The proper attitude to
them? And how could using concepts in this way help the hypothetical
male student I described above deal with his internalized ideology of
masculinity, the effects of that ideology on his own experiences, and its
effects on his reactions to others?
DOGEN: IDEOLOGY AND THINKING
Both Wittgenstein and Nagarjuna spoke to the above issues, but their
practical advice is not very direct. Wittgenstein developed his
philosophical methodology to clear up conceptual confusions and to show
one the way out of the difficulties these confusions engendered by
returning language from its false and distorted metaphysical uses to its
everyday uses, its “original home” (1968, sec. 116). “The real discovery is
the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I
want to. — The one that gives philosophy peace so that it is no longer
tormented by questions which bring itself in question” (sec. 133). How is
it that philosophy can achieve this peace? What is the “original home” of
language? Nagarjuna also endorsed everyday uses of natural language
as it is employed in the course of human lives: “The highest sense [of
truth] is not taught apart from practical behavior” (1967, 24:10); and
“When emptiness ‘works’, then everything in existence ‘works’” (24:14).
For him, as for Wittgenstein, language has sense only in the context of
practical, everyday behaviour, in the stream of life. But how can one use
language in a way consistent with the philosophy of emptiness, that is,
without either reifying and essentializing it or, alternately, falling into
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nihilism, when everyday people in their everyday lives suffer the
confusions that result from these philosophical moves? The thirteenth-
century Japanese Buddhist philosopher and Zen master Dogen most
directly addressed the question of correct and incorrect uses of thought
on the phenomenological level, and so of language, and he amplified the
role of meditation practice in achieving correct uses.
In his work translated as “A Universal Recommendation for Zazen,”
Dogen (1976) explains in detail how to sit in meditation: how to place the
mat, the body, and the mind.
Finally, having regulated your body and mind in this way, take a deep breath, sway your
body to left and right, then sit firmly as a rock. Think of non-thinking. How is this done?
By thinking beyond thinking and nonthinking (p. 46).
Kasulis (1981) translates Dogen’s terminology for these three categories
of thought in a somewhat clearer, easier to follow, way, as “thinking,”
“not-thinking,” and “without-thinking” or “non-thinking” (chap. 6; see
also Kasulis, 1977). In the discussion to follow I will use his translation
and opt for “without-thinking” for “thinking beyond thinking and non
thinking.” What, then, is it to “think beyond thinking and non thinking,”
to engage in “without-thinking”? And how is it that this is the realization
of wisdom?
In Dogen’s tripartite categorization, thinking is a common practice,
familiar to all. It is conceptualization, the attribution of qualities and
characteristics to things and persons. However, in his commentary on
Dogen’s concept of thinking, Kasulis (1977) makes the point that what
Dogen denotes is more than a mere mechanical attribution of predicates,
rather there is a “category-affirming attitude within consciousness” (p.
69; Kasulis, 1981, p. 74). Thinking, then, is the tendency to reify concepts
and thus to react to them as permanently existing entities. Not-thinking
is simply the opposite of thinking, the rejection of thinking, its refusal,
perhaps an attempt to achieve a sort of blanking out or a state of sleep (p.
69).
Without-thinking, which characterizes meditation practices, goes
beyond either of these, but in what sense? Both Dogen and Wittgenstein
suggest two senses: those of being both logically and phenomenologically
prior to either of them. Without-thinking occurs on the level of pre-
reflective experience that, Wittgenstein argues, provides the “prototype”
for language-games (Wittgenstein, 1970, sec. 541). A language-game is
developed out of this matrix of lived experience; it is what the words are
woven into to form a language-game. At the earliest stage of language
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acquisition, when children begin to weave words into pre-linguistic
experience, they can not reflect on language because they lack the language
to do so (cf. Wittgenstein, 1968, sec. 5–6, p. 244, and passim) and thus
they are unable to enter into the thinking stage that Dogen describes.
Logically and phenomenologically they are without-thinking. Kasulis
(1977; see also Kasulis, 1981, pp. 74–77) puts Dogen’s point in surprisingly
Wittgensteinian terms when he says without-thinking
takes neither an affirming nor a negating attitude for its intentionality. Since it does not
objectify ideas, there is no object for it to either affirm or deny. For Dogen, this pre-
reflective or pre-conceptual state of mind is more fundamental than the other two and it
is the proper attitude to assume in seated meditation. (p. 70)
Without-thinking, then, takes no intentional attitude; it neither reifies
nor rejects concepts, nor does it involve an identification of the self with
them. To achieve this non-essentializing, detached attitude is to achieve
an experiential understanding of emptiness, to achieve (at least a taste
of) wisdom. Important for Dogen, without-thinking is a stance one can
take toward cognition as well as toward other forms of experience; one
can just as well play chess or solve a math problem “without-thinking”
as one can sit in zazen or tend the garden. Dogen maintained throughout
his work, perhaps most accessibly in his Instructions for the Cook (2001),
that this attitude should extend into all of one’s daily life. With it, one is
able to act and respond freely and spontaneously, unimpeded by
preconceptions or biases.
TECHNIQUES AND APPLICATIONS
Yoga is a comprehensive term that includes somatic disciplines, breath
work, ethics, philosophy, a multitude of meditation techniques, and more.
A wide range of yogic techniques, including the various forms of practice
that Westerners tend to separate out as meditation, such as the currently
popular Vipassana/insight/mindfulness style of meditation, have been
developed and perfected over millennia to help practitioners confront
the confusions, illusions, and delusions that result from the misuse or
misunderstanding of language. Of particular importance for anti-
oppressive teachers is the insight, which we have briefly explored above,
that people reify binaristically constructed concepts of self, gender, race,
and a host of other categories with which they then identify and to which
they become deeply attached at the same time that they assign the
oppositional terms to others. This reification and the subsequent
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experience of identification and attachment limit the degree of change
that merely developing new intellectual positions, such as theoretical
anti-essentialism or feminism, can have in the life of a student. If, as
Wittgenstein (1968) has shown, understanding necessarily implicates
what people “do,” in the broadest sense of that word, then students who,
for example, intellectually affirm anti-essentialism and yet continue to
live as if essentialism were true, clinging on non-intellectual levels to
reified ideas of self and others, do not fully understand anti-essentialism.
As meditation traditions have shown, one can most effectively remove
the attachment to the ideas that structure and may contaminate our
lives by a direct and deliberate confrontation with their manifestations
on all levels of experience. This confrontation is effected through
mindfulness meditation, the “particular way of paying attention . . . that
gives rise to a moment-to-moment, non-judging awareness” (Kabat-Zinn,
2000, p. 230). Through mindfulness meditation students are able to
develop an awareness of the corporeal and emotional responses that
accompany ideas, opening up the possibility to more completely address
their effects their lives. This is the deeper level of the dissolution of
confusion that Wittgenstein gestured toward (1968, Sec. 133) but did not
fully theorize. It is the beginning of wisdom in the meditation traditions.
Interest in North America in a wide range of forms of yoga and
meditation has grown rapidly over the past few decades and there has
been a concomitant proliferation of teachers and traditions on offer.
Scholars (Hall & Ames, 1995) have argued at length against the
appropriateness of transposing Western concepts of religion to the home
cultures of these practices and so it is appropriate that they are usually
presented as non-denominational techniques. A common aim of many
yogic techniques, frequently lost in the process of their Western
commodification, is to develop an increasingly refined mindfulness or
self-awareness. Mindfulness techniques involve being well-seated,
perhaps but not necessarily in the manner Dogen describes; turning one’s
focus of attention inward; and observing without engaging with them
one’s ideas, emotions, and sensations as they arise. Doing so results not
only in an expanded awareness of the full range of experience attendant
upon a particular ideational content, but also in a growing appreciation
of the transitoriness of all levels of experience. An experiment that usually
surprises beginning students and dramatically makes this point is to
have them sit quietly, watch for the next urge to itch, but not act on it.
Within seconds what they would have taken as an irresistible urge (to
itch) and a physical sensation (the tickle) that would persist until it was
attended to have vanished! So too with many of the experiences which,
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usually non-consciously, attend their ideas. The awareness they achieve
empowers students to make choices about the attitudes and the
experiences they wish to preserve. This empowerment radically deepens
and widens their education. With it they can decide not only to reject
oppressive and discriminatory positions, but begin to live these decisions
in all areas of their lives. Thus, through the use of mindfulness techniques,
a male student grappling with masculine ideology may become aware of
the subtle, and sometimes not-so-subtle, manifestations of sexist ideas
in his life and relationships and so be able to change them.
A growing body of yoga and especially mindfulness techniques are
being used in disciplines as diverse as medicine, psychology, and sports
and fitness, among others. As well, feminist scholars have theorized that
yoga techniques can help women access unoccupied subjective sites from
which to mount resistance to oppressive discourses by enabling them to
develop forms of self-acceptance uncontaminated by such patriarchal
institutions as the beauty industry (Kaplan, 1997). Others are exploring
their theoretical resources for various feminist projects (Klein, 1987, 1994;
Orr, 2002a, 2002b, 2004). Recent research has turned to their pedagogical
uses.
In a pioneering study that provides evidence of some of the positive
effects these techniques can produce, Miller (1994) taught mindfulness
techniques to participants in a variety of university-level classes at the
Ontario Institute for Studies in Education. His students’ self-reports in
journals kept during their course documented increases in areas ranging
from the development of focus, attention, and concentration, to a growing
awareness of their connectedness with others and the world around
them. Empirical research (Emavardhana & Tori, 1997) shows that for
young adults mindfulness practice significantly enhanced self-concept,
self-esteem, benevolence, impulse control, and the ability to handle stress
while reducing many forms of defense mechanisms. Significantly for
mindful pedagogy, they also reported a “powerful effect” on beliefs and
practices (p. 200). The sense of a common humanity found in Miller’s
work combined with increased benevolence found by Emavardhana and
Tori are important factors for reducing the alienation in which
discriminatory attitudes are rooted. Enhanced self-concept and self-
esteem combined with impulse control and the ability to handle stress
will further strengthen tendencies to non-discriminatory responses.
Other research undertaken through the School Counseling Program at
the School of Education at Brooklyn College/State University of New
York specifically addresses internalized gender oppression. Forbes (2003,
2004) has shown that mindfulness can help inner-city boys both to
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develop awareness of and to ameliorate problematic internalized
masculine behaviours. Thus, as these examples show, both theoretical
and empirical research support the premise that mindfulness techniques
will enhance the goals of critical anti-oppressive pedagogy.
Two additional factors serve to recommend the exploration of uses of
mindfulness in the classroom. The first resides in the fact that, because of
its very nature, it is resistant to abuse. Mindfulness is a technique that
functions to increase awareness but is not itself a doctrine or ideology.
This enlarged awareness enables students to make more informed choices
without guiding those choices and thus nurtures radical empowerment.
It is also inherently low-tech and low-cost, a major consideration in
these times of underfunding. As with all yogic disciplines, teachers must
train to become teachers themselves but, while this training demands
dedication, it is not itself expensive to obtain. It can then be passed on to
students with virtually no outlay for materials.
In summary, the work of Wittgenstein, Nagarjuna, and Dogen in
conjunction with mindful yogic meditation practices offers a rich and
untapped resource for feminist and other anti-oppressive pedagogies.
These philosophers provide ways to begin to theorize human beings as
holistic, relational, and a part of the natural order, while recognizing the
distinctly human attainments of intellection and complex cultural
development. Taken together they provide a therapeutic of understanding,
complete with aetiology, diagnostics, and treatments. With yogic
meditation techniques such as mindfulness, they can bridge the socially
constructed gulf between mind and body, feeling and spirit, ideas and
life, and self and other that current pedagogy is often unable to span.
With the research that teachers today such as Miller (1994) and Forbes
(2003, 2004) are conducting, a new model of anti-oppressive pedagogy is
beginning to emerge that is certain to have much broader applications at
all levels of teaching and learning.
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